The Islamic Republic of Iran represents a quizzical system of government. Founded by the hardline religious conservative Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini after the 1979 Iranian revolution, the state possesses both religious and elected institutions, sometimes referred to as a “dual sovereignty.”^[1]

The existence of such a state raises the question of democracy’s compatibility with Islam and the ideological underpinnings of an Islamic republic. Some view the Islamic Republic as an oxymoron, whereas others find it an amalgamation of interlocked ideologies and principles.

This paper will analyse the nature of Islam’s relationship with democracy and compare it to the ideological foundations of Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic Republic. It will discuss Khomeini’s religious position on an Islamic state and the internal strife within Iran’s clerical establishment on whether sovereignty lies with God, the people, or somewhere in between.

Defining Islamic Democracy

Islam and Democracy espouse a complex relationship. Neither has a widely accepted unitary definition.  Alex Hadeniouse defined democracy as ‘a general principle of popular sovereignty, a principle of freedom, and a principle of equality’. ^[2]. Islam represents a comprehensive religion that provides a perfected formula for every aspect of life, including politics. Hence, a “divine sovereignty” exists within Islam that a democratic notion of “popular sovereignty” contradicts^[3]. Scholars who espouse this view are generally classified as “rejectionist”.

However, an array of “reformist” Islamic scholars also exists that affirms at least limited compatibility between Islam and democracy. They view Islamic concepts of Shura (consultative decision-making) and Itjihad (independent reasoning) as sufficient means of Islamic democracy. Moreover, as Islam does not dictate a single system of government and democracy does not represent a single entity, extensive areas of ideological overlap are possible. Islam enthusiastically advocates the key democratic values of self-determination and self-fulfilment, according to Kurshid Ahmed.^[4] Abdelwahab El-Affendi, likewise, asserts that democratic principles such as liberty, equality and tolerance are mirrored by Islam.^[5] demonstrating that there is indeed an overlap of principles between the two.

Furthermore, Khaled Abou El-Fadl, an Egyptian American legal scholar, points to the Islamic principle of vicegerency, that individuals act as God’s stewards and so possess a special worth not shared with state institutions, as a key reason why democratic popular sovereignty can be represented Islamically^[6] This analysis recognises how faith can intertwine with our human structures.

However, we must acknowledge the counter-view of “rejectionists” such as Sayyid Qutb. Though Qutb accepts that Islam has principles compatible with democracy, he views Islamic law (Shariah) as more authoritative than Shura, because it is concise enough to undermine Shura’s necessity in effectively all cases.^[7] He views elections as fundamentally corrupt, as elites who fund parties or candidates have an outsised influence over electoral outcomes.^[8] Though Qutb accepts that an Islamic state must include consultation between rulers and ruled, the state’s main aim must be to bring about Shariah. Hence, democracy can only be limited. It cannot infringe upon God’s sovereignty, as expressed through Shariah. His work laid the foundations for future Islamist states, especially Iran, which was the first successful Islamic

revolution.

The Islamic Republic of Iran

 “Islamic government may therefore be defined as the rule of divine law over men” – Ayatollah Khomeini^[9]

The Islamic “Republic” of Iran is a state that combines elected institutions, such as a majlis (Parliament) and an elected President, with unelected Islamic centres of power, such as the Supreme Leader.^[10] Its founder, Ayatollah Khomeini, created this fusion of democracy and Islam after the 1979 Iranian revolution, but ironically, his ideology is closer to Qutb’s rejectionist position.

Like Qutb, Khomeini believes in the inalienable supremacy of Shari’ah over every aspect of governance. Khomeini’s book, Islamic Government, unapologetically makes this case. Khomeini states that “God Almighty, in addition to revealing a body of law (i.e., the ordinances of the sharī‘ah), has laid down a particular form of government together with executive and administrative institutions.”^[11]

Nevertheless, Khomeini believes that this hardline position of an Islamic state is still effectively democratic. Khomeini states that “The body of Islamic laws that exist in the Qur’an and Sunnah has been accepted by the Muslims and recognised by them as worthy of obedience. This consent and acceptance facilitates the task of government and makes it truly belong to the people.”^[12] He believes that, as Shari’ah is a code of laws designated by God to produce the most perfect existence, it is the only governing system in the people’s interest. As all other governing systems are corrupt and serve malign purposes, Shari’ah represents the only system that can be considered democratic. This is necessary to understand how democracy has changed in Iran since 1979, especially when dealing with elective components of a structure purposely designed to maintain itself after Khomeini’s death.

The Islamic Republic’s Reform Movement

Despite Khomeini’s assertion of a state based on the singular sovereignty of Islamic law, the Iranian constitution, drafted by his shadow government in 1979, incorporated aspects of representative democracy from its outset. Takeyh asserts that “In contrast to Khomeini, some of his younger followers such as Rafsanjani and Mutahhari did not oppose the creation of representative institutions”. These disciples viewed elections as “a means of mobilising poor people and the lower classes for political purposes”. However, this early incorporation of representative institutions would give rise to Iran’s reform movement, which Takeyh asserts was “one of the most intellectually vibrant democratic movements in the contemporary Middle East”^[13]

Takeyh claims Abdul Karim Soroush was the movement’s “intellectual forerunner” ^[14]Soroush, an Iranian-Islamic scholar, “advocated a religious democratic government”. He enthusiastically supports the fusion of Democracy with Islam. He also believed that an Islamic state should be shaped by the will of the majority. He views democracy as a “rejection of tyranny” and separates democracy into a value system and a type of government, with the former upholding human rights as a key value shared with Islam.^[15] Soroush contends Islam could accommodate democracy  because he believed that interpretations of Islamic texts could change over time to address contemporary demands.^[16]

The reform movements were also buttressed by more conservative thinkers, such as Ayatollah Muntaziri, politicians such as Abdullah Nuri and academics like Hashem Aqajari. They had ideological differences, but fundamentally, they believed in sharing sovereignty with the people, even if doing so superseded Shari’ah.

The impact these scholars had is significant, especially in early 2000s Iran. The reformist Hujjat al-Islam Sayyid Muhammad Khatami was elected president in 1997 with 69% of the vote. The election itself could be considered a democratic achievement., as turnout was higher than in previous elections. Khatami, who had previously served as culture minister and was educated in Western philosophy, was allowed to run and was even supported by Rafsanjani, the incumbent president. Takehy asserts that “the election demonstrated how the electorate had changed, as increased literacy, urbanisation and women’s participation in the workforce had created a more informed and involved citizenry^[17]

People were also influenced to expand their democratic rights when learning of Khatami’s policies. Khatami set about major reforms to liberalise the state. He expanded civil society, put key ministries in reformist hands and deregulated the press, leading to an explosion of public discourse. “A remarkable range of newspapers and magazines began debating issues ranging from women’s rights to theological reform. The numbers were indeed impressive: In 1998 Iran saw 880 new publications with an estimated readership of 12 million”.^[18]

For a year, it seemed an Islamic Democratic Republic of Iran could emerge.

But this phase ended fast. Takeyh points out that Khatami failed to establish strong political institutions to advance his democratic agenda. Hardliners quickly recovered from the shock of Khatami’s election and moved to scuttle the Reformist efforts. The Conservatives utilised the Judiciary to prosecute key officials in Khatami’s government, such as Tehran’s mayor, Ghulam Husayn Karbaschi, and Khatami’s interior minister, Abdullah Nuri.^[19] The judiciary also shut down scores of pro-Reform new outlets. In 1998, assassinations further intimidated the Reformists, targeting nationalist politicians and intellectuals^[20]. In 1999, student protests were suppressed, which crippled reformist legitimacy.^[21]

Khatami ultimately failed. Iran’s conservative hardliners stood behind Khomeini’s strict interpretation of Islamic rule and undermined the Reform movement’s push for Islamic Democracy. Takeyh’s analysis reiterates how Khomeini’s original ideology continues to be maintained in Iran, preventing the full potential of what could be Islamic Democracy. Nevertheless, the Khatami period is not forgotten in Iran, and just as stated before, it helped fuel the reform movements we see today.

Conclusion

Islam and democracy are two ideologies that share numerous similarities. Some scholars, such as Soroush, believe that Islam is amenable to democratic values and institutions, as it can be reinterpreted and is based on human values such as human rights, justice, and freedom. Others contend that Islam does not forbid democratic institutions, even if sovereignty lies with God. Such scholars point to the rightly guided Khalifs and their early use of democratic institutions.

Sayyid Qutb, influential in Islamism, believed in the inalienable supremacy of Islamic law, Shari’ah, and that it should cover all aspects of an Islamic state. This influenced Ayatollah Khomeini’s ideology, who designed a state around these tenets, while at the same time, maintaining elective aspects of the structure of Iran.

However, Iran has a rich mixture of Islamic scholars who disagreed with this strict interpretation of an Islamic state and pushed for further democratic institutions in the Islamic Republic. The resulting reformist movement under President Khatami attempted to remake Khomeini’s state into an Islamic democracy which shared sovereignty with its people. They ultimately failed to overcome the Islamic Republic’s hardline elites, who reinforced Ayatollah Khomeini’s strict interpretation of Islamic rule. Ultimately, the effect that Islamic Democracy had is not forgotten, and as recognised by this article, is contentious today.

[1] Abedin, Iran Resurgent, 42.

[2] Parray, Islam and Democracy in the 21st Century, 21.

[3] Parray, Islam and Democracy in the 21st Century, 29.

[4] Parray, Islam and Democracy in the 21st Century, 21.

[5] Parray, Islam and Democracy in the 21st Century, 39.

[6] Parray, Islam and Democracy in the 21st Century, 39.

[7] Parray, Islam and Democracy in the 21st Century, 292.

[8] Parray, Islam and Democracy in the 21st Century, 291

[9] Khomeini, Islamic Government, 53.

[10] Abedin, Iran Resurgent, 25.

[11] Khomeini, Islamic Government, 39.

[12] Khomeini, Islamic Government, 53.

[13] Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution, 181.

[14] Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution, 182.

[15] Parray, Islam and Democracy in the 21st Century, 228.

[16] Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution, 183.

[17] Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution, 187.

[18] Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution, 191.

[19] Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution, 191.

[20] Talwar, “Iran in the Balance,”

[21] Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution, 192.