Japanese foreign policy, its relationship and commitment to pacifism, is best described by former Foreign Minister Sonoda Sunao: “It has been a constant goal of Japanese foreign policy to avoid entanglement with collective security arrangements” ^[1]. This, however, is the traditional stance that has seen a transformation into more recent commitments to collective security and mutual defence by Prime Ministers Abe and Takaichi. Japan has been on a slow and gruelling path towards further strengthening its national security. This has largely been done through slow incremental changes to defence policy by the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP), which, in most cases, has not been largely supported by the public. However, the tides have changed. The LDP has been able to finish its ambitious foreign and defence policy goals and is on the cusp of revising the constitution.

Currently, Japan is on track to finish the desires of the late Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, with 93% of LDP members of the national diet supporting some form of constitutional revision ^[2], with the most recent public polling suggesting that 54% of the public support constitutional revision ^[3]. The LDP now has the ⅔ majority in the National Diet and the voter majority that would allow for a successful national referendum on the constitution ^[4]. Previous to any amendments to the constitution, the SDF existed outside of the constitution, formally established under the 1954 SDF Law. Now the LDP seeks to include the SDF in the constitution to legitimise the SDF and permit overseas deployment. This matters significantly as the Japanese constitution has created the pacifist norms that the country maintains, and which are the parameters that dictate Japan’s foreign and defence policy. Two key ideas are defined by the constitution that constrain the SDF and the LDP from improving Japanese national security and have played a key part in opposition to changes in Japanese defence policy, being the “right to live in peace” and the renunciation of the right to threaten or use force in international disputes^[5]. The parameters of this pacifism have been defined not only by restraints of the peace constitution but also popular pacifism, wartime trauma, unconditional surrender and nuclear allergy, which carefully constructed Japanese foreign policy ^[6]. With the slow degradation of this popular pacifism, Japan stands to end any constitutional commitments to pacifism.

Japanese security policy towards and links with the East Asian region were to be determined not only by the structural factor of the legacy of colonialism and the norm of anti-militarism, but also, and often more powerfully, by the international structural factor of bipolarity and norm of bilateralism^[7]. As the international structure and its norms are degraded and challenged, Japan has had to change and shift its security policy without dealing with the significant legacy of its colonialism, which has caused significant criticism of the strengthening Japanese security apparatus.

Within the “parameters of pacifism”, Japanese defence policy has operated under two different concepts: an exclusively “defensive defense” and “comprehensive security” ^[8], the former being that the SDF should have none too extremely limited ability to operate outside of the Japanese home islands. This policy would restrict the SDF from operating mid-air refuelling, stand-off munitions and other such systems that could be defined as “offensive”. Compared to the latter concept, which would allow the SDF to operate overseas but would be constrained only to overseas aid and disaster relief ^[9]. However, there has been a more modern development of a new concept, deemed “proactive pacifism”, which saw a massive transformation of Japanese foreign and defence policy and its relation to pacifism. Unlike in the past, Japan not only employs its civilian assets (foreign aid and economic diplomacy) but is also readying itself with military assets to promote global pacifism without becoming a full-fledged ‘military state’ ^[10]. Japan seeks overseas deployment of the SDF and contributions to international security that improve upon and are larger than previous chequebook diplomacy, as seen during the 1st Gulf war or the limitations of the UN Peacekeeping Operations Bill, which allowed dispatch of the SDF abroad, limited to logistical and humanitarian support, monitoring elections and providing aid in civilian administration ^[11].

This proactive pacifism has rapidly developed Japanese defence capabilities and has threatened perceptions of Japan as a pacifist nation. What has been significant is the growth in the scope of Japanese defence policy and links. In 2013, the Cabinet Legislative Bureau, a judicial review for the government, recognised that Japan possesses the right of Collective Self Defence but cannot exercise it without violating the constitution ^[12]. However, following the “Cabinet Decision on Development of Seamless Security Legislation to Ensure Japan’s Survival and Protect its People” in 2014, this was changed, and the Abe government recognised Japan’s right to engage in collective self-defence and furthermore defined that the protection of the “right to live in peace” supports this reinterpretation of Article 9 ^[13]. Furthermore, it states Article 9 does not prohibit the use of force in an international dispute as a means of self-defence ^[14]. This cabinet decision was supported by rulings made by the Tokyo district court in which plaintiffs claimed their right to live in peace was violated by the decision were denied ^[15]. This new capacity for collective self-defence was put into practice with the Camp David Principles, in which, in case of an attack against the Republic of Korea, Japan and the United States, parties would be required to engage in a discussion on what a response should be ^[16]. However, these principles are nonbinding and only act to encourage cooperation between the parties. Under Prime Minister Kishida, the deployment of stand-off munitions is part of Japan’s China strategy, able to launch a preemptive strike against China ^[17]. A preemptive strike was deemed constitutional and an act of self-defence by former Defence Minister Taro Kano in 2020, supported by a panel of defence experts agreeing that Japan needs the capacity for a first strike ^[18]. As of most recently, Prime Minister Takaichi accelerated plans to increase the defence budget to 2%, scrapping the 2027 target and implementing the increase by the end of fiscal year 2025, a 60% increase in the defence budget ^[19].

Japan is not going to transform into or return to its previous heights of militarism, nor is it attempting to trigger conflict in the region. Japan is stepping up to take a larger role in East Asian security, with many coming to distrust the US 77% percent do not believe the United States would defend Japan in a crisis ^[20]. Japan is taking a pragmatic approach to the developing situation, diplomacy has failed, and now is the time for posturing and to increase its military capabilities. Japan does not want war; it is not abandoning pacifism, but is instead choosing to protect the peace through increased defence capacity.