The conflict in Sudan that was highly neglected by traditional media, has suddenly gained visibility on social media. Images from Google Earth were shared, allegedly depicting the atrocities happening in Sudan. [1] After reaching 15 million views on X, the publication was proven to be not depicting the mass killings it claimed to. If the conclusions drawn from these images are now being challenged, the civil war in Sudan remains one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises. [2] Arguably, the spread of those pictures detached from their context mediatized a conflict that would otherwise often fall into oblivion. However, the spread of disinformation about the conflict may distract people from the actual atrocities that are happening and from those who are actively contributing to and benefiting from it. In 2023, the civil war broke out after the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the recognized governmental army led by the general al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a militia led by the general Hemedti, started to fight for power after aligning to overthrow the al-Bashir regime in 2021. Beyond the humanitarian catastrophe, the conflict has revealed Sudan’s strategic positioning in the region. The United Arab Emirates was one, if not the most active foreign actors in the conflict, supplying weapons to the RSF. The article aims at understanding the genocide not only as a result of a civil war but also as an international battleground by analyzing the involvement of the UAE. I argue that the Sudanese civil war is not only an internal conflict but also a proxy war, intertwined with global economic systems, which undermine the prospect of peace due to the continuous arms flow towards Sudan.

After two years of conflict, the allegations of genocide have become more widespread. The RSF has systemically targeted women and children, engaged in ethnic cleansing, and committed crimes against humanity. This has led to accusations of genocide by various entities, including the United States and the International Criminal Court (ICC). [3] There is nothing to suggest that the violence will decrease, particularly given the involvement of foreign actors in the region. The support from external power enabled both groups to access arms and funds, which are crucial to continue the conflict. Despite their repeated denials, the UAE has been supporting the RSF by supplying arms via networks involving neighboring countries. Evidence of the UAE involvement includes the discovery of Emirati passports and military equipment exported to the UAE including drones and weapons, in Sudan. [4]  Despite the United Nations’ arms embargo on Sudan, the UAE still engaged in the conflict, exacerbating the situation. The UAE obtained this equipment from various countries, including China, France, the US and the UK, which ultimately arrived in Sudan. [5] 

The UAE has been involved in Sudan for a prolonged period of time due to its interests in Sudan’s land, gold, and strategic position in the region. Following the Arab Spring (2011), which disrupted the balance of power in the Middle East region and the 2017 Gulf crisis – Gulf Cooperation Council countries imposed a blockade on Qatar due to its ties alleged link with terrorism and/or Iran. This led to a competition for regional hegemony between the dominant Gulf States, and so the UAE’s interest in Sudan heightened in 2015. This phenomenon was exacerbated by the power vacuum left by the American progressive disengagement in the region. The new regional actors began asserting their power during the civil war in Yemen (2014-present), in which the UAE employed RSF mercenaries. [6] They proceeded to extend their battle of power to the Horn of Africa. The regional fight for hegemony manifested itself through proxy wars. Asserting influence in Sudan was particularly pivotal because its geostrategic position allowed the UAE the privilege of accessing international maritime roads, a benefit in the quest for regional hegemony. Additionally, after the breaking of the Yemeni war, the Gulf monarchies feared a multiplication of Iranian proxies surrounding them and gaining access to the Red Sea. [7] Using Sudanese mercenaries was not only a way to defend interests without incurring home casualties but also a way to undermine the Iranian threat in Sudan. The UAE compensated the Sudanese government for its participation in Yemen, thereby asserting its influence through financial means. 

From 2017, the UAE’s rivalry with Qatar intensified both in Sudan and throughout the region. While the UAE invested heavily in the Sudanese economy, Qatar relied on political Islam and humanitarian aid. The UAE’s financing became conditional upon sidelining the part of the government supported by Qatar, the Islamists. [8] Yet, the former Sudanese government led by al-Bashir accepted financial aid from both countries, which went against the UAE interests in achieving exclusive influence in

Sudan. Nevertheless, the UAE used its ties with the RSF and SAF created during the conflict in Yemen to diminish the Qatar influence. It resulted with the three parties conspiring to oust the al-Bashir regime. [9] If the UAE helped both groups, they had particular ties with the RSF, as its leader, Hemedti, owns a gold company based in Dubai. [10] As a major gold trading hub, the UAE aimed at reinforcing its control over Sudan by using the RSF as an intermediary to interfere in its domestic politics. After the fall of al-Bashir in 2019, the UAE continued to support the RSF, furthering their investment and influence in Sudan. The UAE gave Hemedti preferential treatment at the expense of the SAF and the civilian groups. They used subsidies to interfere in Sudanese domestic politics, increasing the power of the generals and preventing the Transitional Military Council from transitioning toward democracy. These actions contributed to the lack of democratic development and rising tensions between the SAF and the RSF, ultimately resulting in a civil war. Previous financial support for Sudan was diverted to the RSF, and the gold extracted from RSF-controlled mines is being traded in the UAE. [11]  The RSF’s gold trade is reciprocated with weapons from the UAE, creating a mutually beneficial relationship. The UAE’s involvement created a flow of funds and arms enabling the RSF to continue the conflict and be a competitive opponent to the SAF. 

In an effort to project power overseas, the UAE has invested in infrastructure in Sudan. The country intended to invest 8 billion dollars for a port in Sudan on the Red Sea, which is part of its wider regional hegemony agenda. [12] The SAF, the official Sudanese government, rejected the project, reasserting the UAE need for the RSF to gain power.  Moreover, the Emirates’ position is embedded in a policy of food sovereignty. The UAE and Qatar have been competing powers in the food sector, investing in farmlands and fertile lands. Emirati firms, such as the International Holding Company, are cultivating more than 50 000 hectares in Sudan. Therefore, the Gulf monarchy uses Sudan as a tool to ensure its food security by investing significantly in its agricultural lands. Sudan’s food production is crucial for the UAE because of their desertic climate. They rely on food imports for at 90% of its food supply and have been pursuing a campaign to land-grabbing throughout the world, particularly in Africa. [13]  They benefited from the war to accelerate their campaign while 45 percent of the Sudanese population is currently facing high levels of food insecurity according to the World Food Program. [14] The UAE asserts its influence over Sudan by using financial tools, switching allegiances based on economic interests and their political agendas. Ensuring that the winner of the civil war is on their side is primordial to projecting their political influence and securing return on their previous investments. 

The use of proxy war to serve their interests is particularly beneficial for the UAE. The Gulf monarchy avoided direct confrontation with its opponents while engaging in a power struggle. Funding a foreign militia enables them to avoid a bloodshed at the domestic level, in a country with a small demographic. By outsourcing the conflict, they are putting the lives of Sudanese at risk without facing international accountability. Moreover, they can minimize their involvement in conflicts by simply denying it, avoiding international backlash. Such interventions prolong the conflict. While the UAE supports the RSF, competing powers finance the SAF (Egypt, Turkey), which increases access to weapons and funds to continue the conflict. Since the involvement of international actors is more concealed than through a direct confrontation, they are not being held accountable. Despite Sudan filing a case against the UAE with the ICJ for complicity in genocide, the UAE was not condemned due to a lack of jurisdiction to hear the case. [15] International restrictions on arms have not been imposed on the UAE, which has been hidden behind its denial. In fact, despite the evidence of British, French and American war equipment exported to the UAE being found in Sudan, the three countries did not stop exporting arms to the UAE, which calls into question the former’s complicity in genocide. [16] The UAE has a long precedent of violating UN arms embargoes, including in Libya and Yemen before Sudan. [17] Exporting countries do not respect the obligation to ensure that exported weapons should not be used to violate human rights. 

Despite its official position of advocating for peace in official statements, the UAE has not only fueled the country by arming a genocidal paramilitary group but also contributed to its emergence through foreign meddling. The UAE involvement in Sudan through a proxy war is driven by two intertwined agendas: a political one focused on establishing regional hegemony and an economic one aimed at building an international commercial empire. These agendas self-reinforcing undermined the prospect of peace and contributed to the transformation of the Sudanese civil war into a battleground for regional power politics, with the Sudanese population carrying its human cost.