Ethiopia, throughout history, has been one of the most influential states, not just in the Horn, but the entirety of Africa. The nation has long held prestige on the regional, continental and international level, being one of two African states to never be colonised, the seat of the African Union, and a founding member of the United Nations. Ethiopia believes itself to be a hegemon, and has significant ambition in projecting itself as such. However, the question remain, how secure is Ethiopia’s base as a regional hegemon?

This paper will be split into two parts. I will begin with what I call the Intra-Ethiopia argument. This section will start with an analysis of International Relations theory, specifically the debate around the ‘black box’ of the state. Here, I will embrace Cox’s critical theory of international relations, arguing we must open up the ‘black box’ to understand the nature of state behaviour. I will then apply this theory to the Ethiopian context, hypothesising that due to inter-elite contestation, the rise of ethno-nationalism, and the inability of the central Ethiopian state to project its interests universally within itself, that its rise as a regional hegemon is built on an insecure foundation. I will go on to prove this theory empirically, discussing the ethnic history of Ethiopia and the context in which the ethno-federal system was established. I will then look at the consequences of this system across Ethiopia, noting the way it embolden ethnic elites to leverage ethno-nationalism in their favour and created a fragmented sense of ‘Ethiopiawinet’. These ideas become evident in the analysis of three significant case studies within Ethiopia: The Tigray War (2020-2022), The Oromo Conflict, and the Amhara war (2023-onwards). I will then draw these examples into a narrative on the potential for Ethiopian ‘balkanization’ – the secession of Ethiopia’s provinces. In doing so, I will highlight how the internal nature of the Ethiopian state acts as a significantly insecure base to found a hegemon upon.

I will go on to what I call the Extra-Ethiopian argument. This section will again start with an analysis of International Relations theory, specifically the debate surrounding what a hegemon looks like in the external regional arena. Here, I will embrace Le Gouriellec’s analysis that Ethiopia must adhere to three specific criteria to be considered a true hegemon: military coercive capacity, the generation of consent from its region, the ability to exert influence through social, political and economic structures. I will hypothesise that Ethiopia does not adhere to enough of this criteria to be considered a secure hegemon, and instead argue Ethiopia is an ‘imperfect hegemon’, built on an insecure external base. I will discuss Ethiopia’s military capacity, looking at its material capabilities and how it uses them. I will argue that these capabilities are significant, but that more significant is its ability to project hegemonic might through Peacekeeping Operations. I will then test Ethiopia’s hegemonic credentials against the consent of its neighbours through three case studies: Egypt-Ethiopia and GERD, Somalia-Ethiopia and Somaliland, and Eritrea-Ethiopia and the Red Sea. I will argue that all three of these case studies represent the rejection of Ethiopia’s hegemonic ambition, characterised completely by a lack of consent. Finally, I will analyse Ethiopia’s hegemonic influence through structures. I will discuss Ethiopia’s past hegemonic capacity in structures like the OAU and UN, but argue that influence has not been sustained, evident from contestation within IGAD. Then, I will analyse Ethiopia’s loss of moral authority and thus its inability to influence social structures, receiving heavy criticism from the international community for genocide accusations, and significantly, from its diaspora.

I will conclude that due to its internal situation and external environment Ethiopia can merely be considered an ‘imperfect hegemon’, one who’s rise is founded on an inherently insecure base, at home and abroad.

Intra-Ethiopia

For mainstream international relations scholars, especially those of the realist school of thought, the internal matters of the state are irrelevant to understanding its nature on the international stage.¹ Realists view the state as a ‘black box’, simply to be understood by its inputs and outputs, with no attention paid to its internal workings.² This is highly reductionist, and misses the important nuances and opportunities for understanding that can be achieved by opening up the ‘black box’. As such, a more critical approach must be used. As Cox writes, the state must be understood as the condensation of social forces, where the interests of the dominant class inform its policies.³ However, the state is not a monolithic entity, it is a contested space, where dominant and subordinate classes contend for power.³ The hegemony of a class is only achieved once its interests have been projected as the universal common sense, the natural order of things.³

This theory is particularly significant when applied to the question of Ethiopia’s rise as a regional hegemon. Firstly, it demonstrates that Ethiopia’s rise is merely the reflection of the Ethiopian elite-class’s interests in Addis Ababa onto the regional stage. Secondly, it highlights how this projection does not account for the entirety of Ethiopia. Instead, there is contestation with provincial political elites, who are able to leverage ethno-nationalism to push their own interests. These two issues combine to create a fragmented and contested balance of power within Ethiopia, meaning its rise as a regional hegemon is built on an insecure base, unable to truly project itself. The following section aims to prove this hypothesis.

Ethiopia is one of the most diversely populated nations in the world, which has been a source of significant internal insecurity as a base for its rise as a regional hegemon. Ethiopia’s ethnic population is divided amongst 4 major groups, the Oromo (36%), the Amhara (24%), the Somali (7%) and the Tigray (6%).⁴ These combine with the other 27% to make up a nation of 77 different ethnicities, each with their own distinct language.⁴ As such, ethnic politics has always been at the heart of Ethiopian political structures.⁵ This has long been dominated by the ‘ethnic chauvinism’ of the Amhara, who for the greater part of Ethiopia’s existence have held the most political and economic power, being the ethnic group of the last Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie.⁶ Despite attempts under the communist Derg regime to make ethnic identities irrelevant through ‘scientific socialism’, the approach was ineffective, with ethnic divides eventually leading to the demise of the Derg itself.⁷

In a post-Derg Ethiopia, attempts to mitigate ethnic issues came in the form of ethnic-based federalism.⁸ This split Ethiopia into 9 ethnic-regional states and two federal cities.⁸ The aim of this new constitutional system was to put an end to the ethnic wars and violence seemingly endemic to Ethiopia.⁹ Instead, the tensions structurally built into the federal system could be seen as the key reasons for the supposed ‘unravelling’ of the nation.⁹ The arrangement of centre-periphery, Addis-province, led to the construction of clientelistic relationships between central and provincial governance.¹⁰ Fundamentally, the relationship was characterised by central dominance regarding expenditure, revenue, political dependence, and decision-making, leading to exacerbated tensions and distrust between Ethiopia’s ethnic-regions and the federal government.¹⁰ This gave political entrepreneurs within these regions the political capital to leverage ethnic identity for their own means.⁵ In turn, this meant that the entire institutional framework of Ethiopia promoted a greater sense of ethnic identity rather than national cohesion.⁵

Due to ethno-federalism, populations across Ethiopia are socialised with the values of ethnic particularism across generations.¹¹ This means that the provincial education systems reinforce ethnic identities and create conditions for ethnic intolerance, essentially both othering the central state and other neighbouring states.¹¹ The focus on ethnic language as the medium for education in Ethiopia remains a political rather than pedagogical one.¹² Education centres students in their ‘respective ethnic pasts’, promoting an ‘exclusivist’ sense of solidarity instead of national unity.¹² Through the playing up of the ‘politics of victimology’, the scope of students’ critical thinking and independent thought is severely limited, being dragged back into historic-ethnic ordeals rather than being empowered to transcend the restrictive boxes of ethnic boundaries.¹² In this way, national unity and peaceful coexistence are undermined directly by the ethno-federal system.

The combination of ethno-federal borne clientelism and education creates the perfect conditions for ethnic conflict, amongst both the average individual and regional political elite; it does not solve it.¹³ The extent to which this is instilled in ethnic psyches is well exemplified by the reaction to President Abiy Ahmed’s policy of ‘Ethiopiawinet’ (Ethiopianess), the core of his ‘Medemer’ (Synergy) philosophy.¹³ To many, this ideology mirrored too closely the subjugation felt under longstanding historic Amharan dominance.¹⁴ As a result, many political elites rejected Abiy’s ideology to differing degrees.¹⁵ Oromo leaders called for much greater devolution and a further deepening of ethnic federalism, with many other political elites increasing their ethnic-nationalist rhetoric.¹⁵ Amongst individuals, especially young Ethiopians, the ties to their ethnic identity consistently transcend their sense of ‘Ethiopiawinet’.¹⁶ These trends can be directly connected to the rise of ethnic conflict within Ethiopia.¹³

The Tigrayan War is exemplary of this. The Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) have long been significant political actors within Ethiopia, being a key part of the coalition that overthrew the Derg, and holding significant power in the post-Derg government.¹⁷ Abiy’s ascension to the premiership represented a departure from the TPLF’s dominance, characterised by leaders like Zenawi.¹⁷ With the TPLF no longer able to leverage its clientelism with central government, a power struggle ensued between Abiy’s administration in Addis, and the TPLF in Tigray.¹⁸ Abiy’s removal of TPLF members from key positions in the federal government, armed forces and intelligence services was seen by the TPLF as an attempt to further undermine its influence in Addis.¹⁸ This led to TPLF elites rhetorically pushing secessionist ideas onto their Tigrayan population, effectively forming a base of support for defiance against the central government.¹³ This culminated in the TPLF holding their own elections, which combined with a delay in national elections, sparked the Tigray War in 2020.¹⁷ What followed was a bloody and extensive loss of life on both sides. Despite the African Union (AU) brokered Pretoria Agreement putting an official end to the conflict, tensions within Tigray are still high, with the potential for the conflict to re-spark on the horizon.¹⁹

Tigray is not unique in these issues. The Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), have had similar clashes with the central Ethiopian government in recent years.²⁰ In the wake of the power vacuum left by federal forces moving north to fight in Tigray, the OLA took the opportunity to rise up, claiming the central government was not doing enough to aid the politically and economically marginalised Oromo people.²¹ The OLA clashed with federal and provincial forces in the region,²¹ even going beyond the region to commit atrocities against the Amhara.²² The OLA were able to leverage the Oromo identity to escape on many occasions, being harboured and supplied by everyday Oromo citizens.²² While a peace deal was signed, tensions, just like in Tigray, are mostly unresolved.²³

The Amhara are also at war with the central government. This should come as a surprise, given the historical political dominance of this group within Ethiopia, however, the post-Derg ethno-federalism acted to marginalise the Amhara in the view of its political elites.²⁴ The Amhara identity transformed quickly from representing the values of Ethiopia as a whole, to becoming a peripheral state identity.²⁴ In response to this perceived exclusion, Amhara Nationalism fostered around themes of the restoration of justice and an equal and stronger role for the Amhara in Ethiopian politics.²⁴ Fundamentally, the ethno-federal system has led to an increase in ethnic competition and conflict, alongside the impression of political exclusion, fuelling nationalist sentiments.²⁴ This is especially prevalent inter-ethnically, considering how OLA massacres tended to target Amhara populations specifically.²³ Furthermore, land disputes within the federal system have led to displacement along ethnic lines.²⁴ For the Amhara, this has involved being evicted and run-out of neighbouring territories, instilling a sense of victimhood and thus entrenched ethnic identity.²⁴ This context can be used to explain the war at hand. During the Tigray War, Amhara ethno-nationalist militias fought alongside federal forces against the TPLF, looking to re-claim territories long contested between Amhara and Tigrayan populations in West and South Tigray.²⁵ At the end of the war, the peace deal between the TPLF and central government was deemed to have neglected Amhara’s interests.²⁶ This, alongside accusations that Abiy’s administration had been siding with Oromo interests, formed the basis of tension between Amhara and the Ethiopian state.²⁶ This gave political capital to Fano, an ethnically Amhara militia, who promote a narrative of ‘Amhara genocide’, like so many other groups, politicising ethnicity to reach their own aims.²⁵ The federal government’s attempt to de-militarise Fano post-Tigray war has led to the breakout of conflict within the region, all based on an ideology of ethnic victimization and marginalisation.²⁶ Fano now controls 80% of Amhara, with federal forces holding main towns and highways.²⁵ The group is not inherently separatist, but aims to end the ‘oppression’ of the Amhara, and the ‘balkanization’ of Ethiopia under the ethno-federal system.²⁵

As Ishiyama notes, this rise in ethno-nationalism amongst the Oromo, Amhara and Tigray populations of Ethiopia poses a significant challenge to the central state.²⁷ Without properly addressing the underlying concerns of its ethnic groups, Ethiopia risks potential collapse.²⁷ Through Article 39 of the Ethiopian constitution, states have a right to secede from the Ethiopia.²⁸ Ishiyama draws comparisons to the former USSR, who themselves faced significant internal ethnic divides, leading to dissolution, despite their position as a hegemonic regional and international actor.²⁷ If ethnic tensions continue on this path, Ethiopia faces a future reality of ‘balkanisation’, the dissolution of the Ethiopian state into smaller ethnic groupings just as in the former Yugoslavia.²⁷ Ethiopian secession is not unprecedented; Eritrea, formerly part of Haile Selassie’s Ethiopian empire, fought a long war to gain their own independence.²⁹ The fact is, hegemon or not, Ethiopia faces the very real possibility of dissolution.

Simply put, Ethiopia’s internal struggles cause significant difficulty for its rise as a regional hegemon. Ethiopia’s demographic make up and this make up’s interrelation with its governance structures creates significant national fragmentation, leading to disbelief in the central Ethiopian project, the rise of secessionist ideals, and the undermining of Ethiopia’s legitimacy, to the extent that the future of the nation can be called into question. The major ethnic groups within the country all have ideological issues with the Ethiopian state as a whole. It goes without saying that this is very much an insecure base from which to project hegemony within the region.

Extra-Ethiopia

While international relations theorists argue over the significance of the internal dynamics of the state, they all agree on the importance of its external environment.³⁰ As such, it is important when questioning the security of Ethiopia’s hegemonic base to test it against the region it aims to be the hegemon of.³⁰ For Ethiopia to be a secure hegemon within East Africa, it needs to adhere to three important criteria: one, that it has coercive capacity through military force; two, that it generates consent from its neighbours; and three, that it exerts influence through social, political and economic structures.³¹ Throughout this section I will argue along Le Gouriellec’s line that while Ethiopia portrays itself as a ‘regional benevolent hegemon’ it is rather an ‘imperfect hegemon’, lacking the important characteristics of consent and structural control, merely having a hegemonic military capacity. As such, the external environment upon which Ethiopia aims to build a hegemonic base is inherently insecure.

So, does Ethiopia’s military give it a coercive hegemonic capacity? Ethiopia’s military strength is ranked 52nd in the world, placing its capacity at around that of Romania or Denmark.³² By looking at this comparatively alongside other nations of the region, we see that Ethiopia holds around 40% of the total regional population, 25% of its military personnel, the 4th largest military budget and the third largest economy.³⁰ This means that collectively, the states of the region could contain Ethiopia’s attempts at power projection, indicating minimal coercive capacity.³⁰ This is the argument Gebreluel makes, however, it misses key details about the hegemonic nature of the way Ethiopia projects its military. Simply put Ethiopia has the third largest army on the African continent, and has been able to project its force through conventional warfare, counter-insurgency and most importantly, peacekeeping operations (PKOs).³¹ For a hegemon, PKOs act as a tool to be wielded in the realm of power politics.³¹ In Ethiopia’s case, their engagement in PKOs is motivated by the desire for regional status and influence; national security; political gain; economic profit; and the modernisation/growth of their military.³³ In this way Ethiopia cultivates an image of a ‘security provider’, becoming a recognised power both regionally and internationally.³¹ This is something Ethiopia’s government brazenly admits, stating its willingness to increase its PKO burden ‘at the request of the international community.’³⁴ Furthermore, PKOs act as protection for Ethiopia’s continuing economic development, preserving its image as a safe location for foreign-direct investment (FDI).³¹ The establishment of the Ethiopian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) in 2010 cemented the nation as a hub of international excellence in peacekeeping affairs.³¹ This all plays into Ethiopia’s hegemonic projection of ‘protecting its backyard’, looking to play their part in interventions as a way of subverting the contagion of regional instability that may otherwise undermine their interests.³¹ This all indicates that Ethiopia, on a military level, has the capacity to act like a hegemon, implying there is no insecure base.

However, this identity of a regional guardian is highly debatable on the regional level, the level upon which Ethiopia aims to be a hegemon. As Bereketeab argues, ‘Ethiopia is sabotaging its capacity for hegemonic stature by its aggressive inclinations toward its neighbours.’³⁵ Ethiopia’s coercive ‘means of seeking hegemony betray the very essence of moral authority of hegemony.’³⁵

Ethiopia’s rise as a hegemon is not in a vacuum, and sees contestation from other regional actors. Egypt, themselves asserted as a regional hegemon, take Ethiopia’s rise as a threat. This could be understood through Gilpin’s Hegemonic War Theory, which suggests that due to the anarchy of the international order, when a hegemon’s relative power declines, they are inherently challenged by a new rising power, creating a disequilibrium that results in a hegemonic war.³⁶ Gilpin’s theory, like most realist literature, is somewhat reductionist, but does have some applicability here. While I have always agreed with Wendt’s assertion that anarchy is what states make of it, in this case they appear to be making anarchy.³⁷

The source of Egyptian-Ethiopian tension is within the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Egypt has historically been the hydro-hegemon on the Nile.³⁸ During the colonial-era, Egypt obtained the rights to 75% of the Nile’s flow in a deal with Anglo-Sudan; a deal which importantly excluded upstream nations like Ethiopia.³⁸ Ethiopia has long aimed to challenge this monopoly, and has done so by damming the Nile’s source.³⁸ GERD will revolutionise the Ethiopian economy, providing energy double the necessity for Ethiopia’s grid and energising the nation as a whole, enabling it to further project itself regionally.³⁹ However, for Egypt the dam represents significant insecurity as GERD could severely limit water flows to lower riparian countries.³⁹ The Egyptian identity and economy is built around the Nile, with Egyptian agriculture, civil society and their own High Aswan Dam, all reliant on the Nile’s flow.³⁸ While there is evidence to suggest that GERD at full capacity will not affect Egypt’s Nile-lands significantly, unless in cases of heavy drought,⁴⁰ and that the reduced flow will not impact Egypt’s own High Aswan Dam,⁴¹ this has done little to reassure Egypt in the face of hydro-hegemonic collapse. Egypt views GERD as a national security threat, using alliance-building, securitisation and coercion to counter Ethiopia’s rising hegemony.⁴² This is evident in recent Egyptian military posturing, with the shipment of a major cache of weaponry to Somalia, a longstanding rival of Ethiopia.⁴³ This represents a growing relationship between Egypt and Somalia based on mutual distrust of Ethiopia’s hegemonic ambition.⁴³ In essence, Ethiopia’s hegemonic rise is happening within a context of regional contestation from another great power, a great power who is also leveraging other regional actors’ mistrust of Ethiopia to their advantage. This hardly represents the consent necessary to have a secure base as a hegemon.

Ethiopia’s Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Somaliland represents further hegemonic ambition. The MOU enables Ethiopia to establish a naval base and commercial port in Berbera, Somaliland’s capital.⁴⁴ Berbera is a natural deep water port, something heavily desired by hegemons as valuable locations for trade and military projection.⁴⁴ The MOU solves Ethiopia’s longstanding landlocked problem, now enabling them greater hegemonic capacity.⁴⁴ However, the MOU also means Ethiopia will recognise Somaliland as a state, which has reignited tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia.⁴⁵ Somalia argues this is in breach of its sovereignty, and represents dangerous ‘imperialistic fantasies’ on the part of Ethiopia.⁴⁵ Again, Ethiopia’s hegemonic ambition seems built on an insecure base lacking consent of its neighbours.

Furthermore, this destabilising, non-consensual hegemonic ambition is manifesting itself in tension with another neighbour, Eritrea. Ethiopia and Eritrea have long held historically tense relations, with Ethiopia having annexed the territory in the 1960s, leading to a three-decade-long civil war for Eritrean independence.⁴⁶ However, these tensions subsided under Abiy’s leadership, who himself won the Nobel Peace Prize for his ‘initiative’ in resolving conflict with Eritrea.⁴⁷ Following the end of the Tigrayan war, the exclusion of Eritrea from the peace settlement was seen as a slight, especially given the resumption of TPLF rule in the province, a group Eritrea remains deeply hostile with.⁴⁶ This has led Eritrea to back a rival faction of the TPLF to the new administration in Tigray, TPLF-D.¹⁹ Furthermore, Ethiopia’s ambition for Red Sea port access, something previously achieved prior to Eritrean secession in 1993, continues to drive tension.¹⁹ Abiy has repeatedly declared publicly Ethiopia’s right to sea access, something Eritrea views as an implicit threat of military action.⁴⁶ As such, Eritrea has looked to balance against Ethiopia’s hegemonic ambition, by fuelling proxy conflict in Tigray and maintaining its troops along the Eritrean-Ethiopian border, with some even remaining within Ethiopia itself.¹⁹ Furthermore, following these tensions, Eritrea signed a security pact with Egypt and Somalia, forming an ‘axis’ of resistance against Ethiopia and its hegemonic ambition.⁴⁸

Hegemony is positional and relational, while material preponderance is a precondition of achieving hegemony, without the consent of others hegemony is merely a buzzword to be thrown around.³¹ The region Ethiopia aims to be a hegemon of rejects its ambition, meaning the base for Ethiopia’s rise is fundamentally illegitimate and as such, insecure.

Ethiopia has long seemed hegemonic within institutions. The centrality of its diplomatic backing from Great Powers like the US in its pursuit of regional objectives has always been evident.⁴⁹ Ethiopia is a founding member of the United Nations, and historically was able to leverage this legitimacy to pursue territorial expansion into Eritrea, and later to shield its actions from criticism in enforcing Ethiopianess onto the territory.⁵⁰ Similar can be said of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which Haile Selassie used to protect Ethiopia from Eritrean secession, cementing Eritrea within the OAU’s resolution on the ‘inviolability of colonial boundaries.’⁵⁰ Furthermore, in 1977 with the outbreak of the Ethiopia-Somalia war, the OAU’s aversion to taking sides can be seen as a tacit endorsement of Ethiopian regional political power.³¹ However, in modern day Ethiopia has struggled to impart the same influence in institutions, as actions are often seen as a ‘Trojan Horse’ for Ethiopian interests.³¹ Ethiopia’s role within the Intergovernmental Authority of Development (IGAD) is contested.³⁵ Ethiopia holds significant control of IGAD, where ‘any discussion that would offend Ethiopia could not be entertained.’³⁵ This firm grip is heavily criticised by other regional actors, such as Eritrea, who argue IGAD is merely a tool for Ethiopia to ‘isolate hostile countries,’ being a mechanism manipulated by the US and Ethiopia for their own interests.⁵¹ This is evident through the ‘number of recurring irresponsible resolutions that undermine regional peace and security’ which IGAD adopts.⁵¹ Beyond this, IGAD could be characterised by regional disinterest; both Kenya and Uganda give priority to the East African Community (EAC) as a trading bloc, while there has been no annual summit of IGAD since 2008.⁵² Fundamentally, Ethiopia’s hegemonic projection through political and economic institutions like IGAD is contested by historical grievances, with neighbours accusing the state of pursuing its own self-interested national foreign and security objectives.³¹ This contests Ethiopia’s capacity as a neutral mediator, creating an insecure base from which to project hegemony.

Ethiopia has begun to lose the moral argument, something highly important for projecting hegemony in the Gramscian sense. Moral arguments enable projection through social structures both at home and abroad.³¹ Ethiopia’s actions during the Tigray war have been characterised as genocide, with forces perpetrating massacres, sexual violence and forced starvation against the Tigrayan civilian population.⁵³ According to the New Lines Institute, these actions ‘possessed the intent to destroy Tigrayans as an ethnic group,’ specifically through the deliberate infliction of destructive conditions and measures intended to prevent births among Tigrayans.⁵³ This could lead to Ethiopia being dragged in front of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), something which would destroy Ethiopia’s moral authority not just as a regional hegemon, but globally.⁵³ Furthermore, the influence of Ethiopia’s extensive international diaspora continues to reflect poorly on the state.⁵⁴ The diaspora’s voice is loud and critical, showing so during pro-democracy demonstrations in 2016,⁵⁵ and with continued anti-genocide protests across North America and Europe.⁵⁶ This again reflects poorly on the central Ethiopian project, limiting Ethiopia’s legitimacy as a hegemon by undermining its moral authority and thus leaving its base fundamentally insecure.

While international relations theorists argue over the significance of the internal dynamics of the state, they all agree on the importance of its external environment.³⁰ As such, it is important when questioning the security of Ethiopia’s hegemonic base to test it against the region it aims to be the hegemon of.³⁰ For Ethiopia to be a secure hegemon within East Africa, it needs to adhere to three important criteria: one, that it has coercive capacity through military force; two, that it generates consent from its neighbours; and three, that it exerts influence through social, political and economic structures.³¹ Throughout this section I will argue along Le Gouriellec’s line that while Ethiopia portrays itself as a ‘regional benevolent hegemon’ it is rather an ‘imperfect hegemon’, lacking the important characteristics of consent and structural control, merely having a hegemonic military capacity. As such, the external environment upon which Ethiopia aims to build a hegemonic base is inherently insecure.

So, does Ethiopia’s military give it a coercive hegemonic capacity? Ethiopia’s military strength is ranked 52nd in the world, placing its capacity at around that of Romania or Denmark.³² By looking at this comparatively alongside other nations of the region, we see that Ethiopia holds around 40% of the total regional population, 25% of its military personnel, the 4th largest military budget and the third largest economy.³⁰ This means that collectively, the states of the region could contain Ethiopia’s attempts at power projection, indicating minimal coercive capacity.³⁰ This is the argument Gebreluel makes, however, it misses key details about the hegemonic nature of the way Ethiopia projects its military. Simply put Ethiopia has the third largest army on the African continent, and has been able to project its force through conventional warfare, counter-insurgency and most importantly, peacekeeping operations (PKOs).³¹ For a hegemon, PKOs act as a tool to be wielded in the realm of power politics.³¹ In Ethiopia’s case, their engagement in PKOs is motivated by the desire for regional status and influence; national security; political gain; economic profit; and the modernisation/growth of their military.³³ In this way Ethiopia cultivates an image of a ‘security provider’, becoming a recognised power both regionally and internationally.³¹ This is something Ethiopia’s government brazenly admits, stating its willingness to increase its PKO burden ‘at the request of the international community.’³⁴ Furthermore, PKOs act as protection for Ethiopia’s continuing economic development, preserving its image as a safe location for foreign-direct investment (FDI).³¹ The establishment of the Ethiopian International Peacekeeping Training Centre (EIPKTC) in 2010 cemented the nation as a hub of international excellence in peacekeeping affairs.³¹ This all plays into Ethiopia’s hegemonic projection of ‘protecting its backyard’, looking to play their part in interventions as a way of subverting the contagion of regional instability that may otherwise undermine their interests.³¹ This all indicates that Ethiopia, on a military level, has the capacity to act like a hegemon, implying there is no insecure base.

However, this identity of a regional guardian is highly debatable on the regional level, the level upon which Ethiopia aims to be a hegemon. As Bereketeab argues, ‘Ethiopia is sabotaging its capacity for hegemonic stature by its aggressive inclinations toward its neighbours.’³⁵ Ethiopia’s coercive ‘means of seeking hegemony betray the very essence of moral authority of hegemony.’³⁵

Ethiopia’s rise as a hegemon is not in a vacuum, and sees contestation from other regional actors. Egypt, themselves asserted as a regional hegemon, take Ethiopia’s rise as a threat. This could be understood through Gilpin’s Hegemonic War Theory, which suggests that due to the anarchy of the international order, when a hegemon’s relative power declines, they are inherently challenged by a new rising power, creating a disequilibrium that results in a hegemonic war.³⁶ Gilpin’s theory, like most realist literature, is somewhat reductionist, but does have some applicability here. While I have always agreed with Wendt’s assertion that anarchy is what states make of it, in this case they appear to be making anarchy.³⁷

The source of Egyptian-Ethiopian tension is within the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Egypt has historically been the hydro-hegemon on the Nile.³⁸ During the colonial-era, Egypt obtained the rights to 75% of the Nile’s flow in a deal with Anglo-Sudan; a deal which importantly excluded upstream nations like Ethiopia.³⁸ Ethiopia has long aimed to challenge this monopoly, and has done so by damming the Nile’s source.³⁸ GERD will revolutionise the Ethiopian economy, providing energy double the necessity for Ethiopia’s grid and energising the nation as a whole, enabling it to further project itself regionally.³⁹ However, for Egypt the dam represents significant insecurity as GERD could severely limit water flows to lower riparian countries.³⁹ The Egyptian identity and economy is built around the Nile, with Egyptian agriculture, civil society and their own High Aswan Dam, all reliant on the Nile’s flow.³⁸ While there is evidence to suggest that GERD at full capacity will not affect Egypt’s Nile-lands significantly, unless in cases of heavy drought,⁴⁰ and that the reduced flow will not impact Egypt’s own High Aswan Dam,⁴¹ this has done little to reassure Egypt in the face of hydro-hegemonic collapse. Egypt views GERD as a national security threat, using alliance-building, securitisation and coercion to counter Ethiopia’s rising hegemony.⁴² This is evident in recent Egyptian military posturing, with the shipment of a major cache of weaponry to Somalia, a longstanding rival of Ethiopia.⁴³ This represents a growing relationship between Egypt and Somalia based on mutual distrust of Ethiopia’s hegemonic ambition.⁴³ In essence, Ethiopia’s hegemonic rise is happening within a context of regional contestation from another great power, a great power who is also leveraging other regional actors’ mistrust of Ethiopia to their advantage. This hardly represents the consent necessary to have a secure base as a hegemon.

Ethiopia’s Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Somaliland represents further hegemonic ambition. The MOU enables Ethiopia to establish a naval base and commercial port in Berbera, Somaliland’s capital.⁴⁴ Berbera is a natural deep water port, something heavily desired by hegemons as valuable locations for trade and military projection.⁴⁴ The MOU solves Ethiopia’s longstanding landlocked problem, now enabling them greater hegemonic capacity.⁴⁴ However, the MOU also means Ethiopia will recognise Somaliland as a state, which has reignited tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia.⁴⁵ Somalia argues this is in breach of its sovereignty, and represents dangerous ‘imperialistic fantasies’ on the part of Ethiopia.⁴⁵ Again, Ethiopia’s hegemonic ambition seems built on an insecure base lacking consent of its neighbours.

Furthermore, this destabilising, non-consensual hegemonic ambition is manifesting itself in tension with another neighbour, Eritrea. Ethiopia and Eritrea have long held historically tense relations, with Ethiopia having annexed the territory in the 1960s, leading to a three-decade-long civil war for Eritrean independence.⁴⁶ However, these tensions subsided under Abiy’s leadership, who himself won the Nobel Peace Prize for his ‘initiative’ in resolving conflict with Eritrea.⁴⁷ Following the end of the Tigrayan war, the exclusion of Eritrea from the peace settlement was seen as a slight, especially given the resumption of TPLF rule in the province, a group Eritrea remains deeply hostile with.⁴⁶ This has led Eritrea to back a rival faction of the TPLF to the new administration in Tigray, TPLF-D.¹⁹ Furthermore, Ethiopia’s ambition for Red Sea port access, something previously achieved prior to Eritrean secession in 1993, continues to drive tension.¹⁹ Abiy has repeatedly declared publicly Ethiopia’s right to sea access, something Eritrea views as an implicit threat of military action.⁴⁶ As such, Eritrea has looked to balance against Ethiopia’s hegemonic ambition, by fuelling proxy conflict in Tigray and maintaining its troops along the Eritrean-Ethiopian border, with some even remaining within Ethiopia itself.¹⁹ Furthermore, following these tensions, Eritrea signed a security pact with Egypt and Somalia, forming an ‘axis’ of resistance against Ethiopia and its hegemonic ambition.⁴⁸

Hegemony is positional and relational, while material preponderance is a precondition of achieving hegemony, without the consent of others hegemony is merely a buzzword to be thrown around.³¹ The region Ethiopia aims to be a hegemon of rejects its ambition, meaning the base for Ethiopia’s rise is fundamentally illegitimate and as such, insecure.

Ethiopia has long seemed hegemonic within institutions. The centrality of its diplomatic backing from Great Powers like the US in its pursuit of regional objectives has always been evident.⁴⁹ Ethiopia is a founding member of the United Nations, and historically was able to leverage this legitimacy to pursue territorial expansion into Eritrea, and later to shield its actions from criticism in enforcing Ethiopianess onto the territory.⁵⁰ Similar can be said of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which Haile Selassie used to protect Ethiopia from Eritrean secession, cementing Eritrea within the OAU’s resolution on the ‘inviolability of colonial boundaries.’⁵⁰ Furthermore, in 1977 with the outbreak of the Ethiopia-Somalia war, the OAU’s aversion to taking sides can be seen as a tacit endorsement of Ethiopian regional political power.³¹ However, in modern day Ethiopia has struggled to impart the same influence in institutions, as actions are often seen as a ‘Trojan Horse’ for Ethiopian interests.³¹ Ethiopia’s role within the Intergovernmental Authority of Development (IGAD) is contested.³⁵ Ethiopia holds significant control of IGAD, where ‘any discussion that would offend Ethiopia could not be entertained.’³⁵ This firm grip is heavily criticised by other regional actors, such as Eritrea, who argue IGAD is merely a tool for Ethiopia to ‘isolate hostile countries,’ being a mechanism manipulated by the US and Ethiopia for their own interests.⁵¹ This is evident through the ‘number of recurring irresponsible resolutions that undermine regional peace and security’ which IGAD adopts.⁵¹ Beyond this, IGAD could be characterised by regional disinterest; both Kenya and Uganda give priority to the East African Community (EAC) as a trading bloc, while there has been no annual summit of IGAD since 2008.⁵² Fundamentally, Ethiopia’s hegemonic projection through political and economic institutions like IGAD is contested by historical grievances, with neighbours accusing the state of pursuing its own self-interested national foreign and security objectives.³¹ This contests Ethiopia’s capacity as a neutral mediator, creating an insecure base from which to project hegemony.

Ethiopia has begun to lose the moral argument, something highly important for projecting hegemony in the Gramscian sense. Moral arguments enable projection through social structures both at home and abroad.³¹ Ethiopia’s actions during the Tigray war have been characterised as genocide, with forces perpetrating massacres, sexual violence and forced starvation against the Tigrayan civilian population.⁵³ According to the New Lines Institute, these actions ‘possessed the intent to destroy Tigrayans as an ethnic group,’ specifically through the deliberate infliction of destructive conditions and measures intended to prevent births among Tigrayans.⁵³ This could lead to Ethiopia being dragged in front of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), something which would destroy Ethiopia’s moral authority not just as a regional hegemon, but globally.⁵³ Furthermore, the influence of Ethiopia’s extensive international diaspora continues to reflect poorly on the state.⁵⁴ The diaspora’s voice is loud and critical, showing so during pro-democracy demonstrations in 2016,⁵⁵ and with continued anti-genocide protests across North America and Europe.⁵⁶ This again reflects poorly on the central Ethiopian project, limiting Ethiopia’s legitimacy as a hegemon by undermining its moral authority and thus leaving its base fundamentally insecure.

Conclusion

Fundamentally, Ethiopia’s rise as a regional hegemon is indeed founded on an insecure base. By looking both internally and externally, we can see that the environments and conditions necessary for secure hegemony simply do not exist for Ethiopia. When looking internally, past the ‘black box’ of the state, and embracing Cox’s critical theory, we can understand Ethiopia’s behaviour. By applying the theory, we find inter-elite contestation, the rise of ethno-nationalism and the inability of the central Ethiopian state to project its interests universally within its own borders. These issues are rooted in ethno-federalism, which emboldened ethnic elites to leverage tensions in their own interest, creating a fragmented national identity. This can be seen within the cases of the Tigray War, Oromo Conflict, and Amhara War. All of this represents the potential for Ethiopian ‘balkanization’ – the secession of Ethiopia’s state into smaller ethnic projects. This is a fundamentally insecure base from which Ethiopia aims to project itself as a regional hegemon.

When looking externally, we can see Ethiopia situated within a debate on what a hegemon looks like on a regional scale. Here, it must adhere to three criteria to be considered a secure hegemon. It must hold a coercive capacity through military strength, must be able to generate consent from its neighbours, and must be able to exert influence through social, political and economic structures. By looking at Ethiopia’s military, we can see its material capacity to project itself as a hegemon, even more importantly through its influence in Peacekeeping Operations. However, Ethiopia fails the test for both other necessary characteristics. In terms of consent, Ethiopia has none from its neighbours. Egyptian-Ethiopian tensions over GERD represent hegemonic conflict, Ethiopia’s MOU with Somaliland represents the renewal of hostilities with Somalia, and Ethiopia’s desire for Red Sea access destroys the brief rapprochement with Eritrea. Essentially, every hegemonic move Ethiopia makes is met with a lack of consent and contestation by its neighbours. Similarly, Ethiopia struggles to exert influence through structures. Despite historic capacity in Haile Selassie’s time to influence both the OAU and UN in Ethiopia’s favour, this trend has not continued, evident from the disinterest and contestation within IGAD. Furthermore, Ethiopia has lost its moral authority, making it unable to influence social structures. This is due to accusations of genocide surrounding the Tigray War, where Ethiopian troops carried out atrocities against local communities. This has compounded with longstanding condemnation and protest by Ethiopia’s diaspora against Ethiopia’s actions, crippling Ethiopia’s legitimacy as a benevolent and moral actor, in turn undermining its hegemonic status.

In short, due to its internal situation and external environment Ethiopia can only be considered an ‘imperfect hegemon,’ one founded on an insecure base within itself and within its regional context.